Suresh v Jiang: Computing Limitation Period for Personal Injury Claims

In Suresh s/o Suppiah v Jiang Guoliang, the High Court of Singapore addressed the computation of the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act. Suresh sued Jiang for damages resulting from a 2012 car accident, filing suit on 7 January 2015. Jiang argued the claim was time-barred. The court allowed Suresh's appeal, holding that the date the cause of action accrued (the accident date) should be excluded when calculating the limitation period, making the suit timely.

1. Case Overview

1.1 Court

High Court of the Republic of Singapore

1.2 Outcome

Appeal Allowed

1.3 Case Type

Civil

1.4 Judgment Type

Judgment

1.5 Jurisdiction

Singapore

1.6 Description

Singapore court clarifies how to compute the 3-year limitation period for personal injury claims under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act.

1.7 Decision Date

2. Parties and Outcomes

Party NameRoleTypeOutcomeOutcome TypeCounsels
Suresh s/o SuppiahAppellant, PlaintiffIndividualAppeal AllowedWon
Jiang GuoliangRespondent, DefendantIndividualAppeal DismissedLost

3. Judges

Judge NameTitleDelivered Judgment
Chan Seng OnnJudgeYes

4. Counsels

Counsel NameOrganization
Gong Chin NamHin Tat Augustine & Partners
Frances Angeline Shanti d/o ThanarajooTan Kok Quan Partnership

4. Facts

  1. Suresh and Jiang were involved in a road traffic accident on 7 January 2012.
  2. Suresh's car was stationary at a junction when Jiang's lorry collided into its rear.
  3. Suresh instituted a lawsuit on 7 January 2015, claiming damages for personal injuries.
  4. Jiang argued that the suit was time-barred under s 24A(2) of the Limitation Act.
  5. The Deputy Registrar struck out Suresh's claim, holding it was time-barred.
  6. The District Judge dismissed Suresh's appeal against the Deputy Registrar's decision.

5. Formal Citations

  1. Suresh s/o Suppiah v Jiang Guoliang, Registrar’s Appeal (State Courts) No 9 of 2016, [2016] SGHC 133

6. Timeline

DateEvent
Road traffic accident occurred
Lawsuit filed
Appearance entered to the suit
Defence filed
Statement of Claim struck out
Appeal dismissed
Application for leave to appeal dismissed
Parties appeared before the judge
Judgment reserved
Judgment issued

7. Legal Issues

  1. Computation of Limitation Period
    • Outcome: The court held that the date on which the cause of action accrued should be excluded for the purpose of computing the three-year limitation period under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act.
    • Category: Procedural
    • Sub-Issues:
      • Exclusion or inclusion of the date on which the cause of action accrued

8. Remedies Sought

  1. Monetary Damages

9. Cause of Actions

  • Negligence

10. Practice Areas

  • Litigation

11. Industries

  • No industries specified

12. Cited Cases

Case NameCourtAffirmedCitationJurisdictionSignificance
Ang Sin Hock v Khoo Eng LimCourt of AppealYes[2010] 3 SLR 179SingaporeCited for the principle that even a one-day delay is not a good reason to allow a time-barred claim to proceed.
Yan Jun v Attorney-GeneralHigh CourtYes[2014] 1 SLR 793SingaporeCited as a case where the court included the date when the cause of action accrued in computing the limitation period, but distinguished because the computation of time was not directly addressed.
Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2827 v GBI Realty Pte Ltd and anotherHigh CourtYes[2014] 3 SLR 229SingaporeCited as a case where the court included the date when the cause of action accrued in computing the limitation period, but distinguished because the computation of time was not directly addressed.
Lian Kok Hong v Ow Wah Foong and AnotherCourt of AppealYes[2008] SGCA 30SingaporeCited for the holding that sections 6 and 24A of the Limitation Act cannot apply concurrently.
Suresh s/o Suppiah v Jiang GuoliangDistrict CourtYes[2015] SGMC 31SingaporeThe District Judge's decision that was appealed against in the present case.
Sun Fook Kong Construction Ltd (formerly known as Sung Foo Kee, Ltd) v Housing and Development BoardHigh CourtYes[2004] SGHC 69SingaporeCited as a case where the court appeared to have excluded the date of accrual of cause of action.
Vijayakumar a/l Subramaniam v Peng Jun Qing and anotherDistrict CourtYes[2009] SGDC 158SingaporeCited as a case where the District Judge expressly referred to the Interpretation Act in her computation of time in relation to limitation to exclude the day the cause of action arose.
Trow v Ind Coope (West Midlands) Ltd and anotherQueen's BenchYes[1967] 2 QB 899England and WalesCited for the principle that the law does not take into account fractions of the day unless some special reason requires it.
Migotti v ColvillCourt of Common PleasYes(1879) 4 CPD 233England and WalesCited for the principle that the law does not take into account fractions of the day unless some special reason requires it.
Pugh v Duke of LeedsKing's BenchYes(1777) 2 Cowp 714England and WalesCited for the principle that there is no fraction of a day in law.
Thomas & Betts (SE Asia) Pte Ltd v Ou Tin Joon and anotherCourt of AppealYes[1998] 1 SLR(R) 380SingaporeCited for the principle that the Rules of Court must be read subject to its primary legislation.
Muhamad Solleh bin Saarani & another v Norruhadi bin Omar & othersKuantan High CourtYes[2010] 9 MLJ 603MalaysiaCited as a case where the court concluded that the Limitation Act was a complete code by itself that excluded the operation of the Interpretation Acts.
Mansource Interior Pte Ltd v Citiwall Safety Glass Pte LtdHigh CourtYes[2014] 3 SLR 264SingaporeCited for the principle that s 50(a) of the Interpretation Act provided guidance on the computation of time relating to the seven-day timeline for lodging an adjudication response under s 15(1) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act.
Citiwall Safety Glass Pte Ltd v Mansource Interior Pte LtdCourt of AppealYes[2015] 5 SLR 482SingaporeCited as the appeal against the Judicial Commissioner’s decision in Mansource Interior Pte Ltd v Citiwall Safety Glass Pte Ltd.
Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co LtdQueen's BenchYes[1961] 2 QB 135England and WalesCited for the interpretation of s 2(1) of the UK Limitation Act 1939, as amended by the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc.) Act 1954, which provided for a relevant limitation period stipulating that actions shall not be brought after the expiration of [three] years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Radcliffe v BartholomewQueen's BenchYes[1892] 1 QB 161England and WalesCited for the statutory provision in issue was s 14 of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1849 (c 92) (UK), where complaints were to be made within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise.
Williams v BurgessQueen's BenchYes(1840) 12 Ad & E 635England and WalesCited for the statutory provision in issue was s 1 of the Warrants of Attorney Act 1822 (c 39) (UK) which stipulated that warrants of attorney to confess judgment shall be filed within-twenty one days after the execution.
Hardy v RyleKing's BenchYes[1828] 9 B & CEngland and WalesCited for the statutory provision in issue was s 8 of the Continuance of Acts 1740 (c 34) (UK) which prescribed that no action shall be brought against any justice of the peace for anything done in the execution of his office unless commenced within six calendar months after the act committed.
Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons LtdCourt of AppealYes[1973] 1 QB 336England and WalesCited for the computation of time for the purposes of s 2(1) of the UK Limitation Act 1939 as well: “The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued…”
Hare v GocherQueen's BenchYes[1962] 2 QB 641England and WalesCited for the words of the statutory provision were phrased as “at the expiration… of one month beginning with the date on which it is passed” (emphasis added), it meant that the day upon which the Act was passed was to be included in the computation of time.
In re North; Ex parte HasluckCourt of AppealYes[1895] 2 QB 264England and WalesCited for the rational mode of computation is to have regard in each case to the purpose for which the computation is made.
Lester v GarlandChanceryYes(1808) 15 Ves 248England and WalesCited as the leading case which considers cases like the present where a period is fixed within which a person must do something or take the consequences.
Webb v FairmanerExchequer of PleasYes(1838) 3 M & W 473England and WalesCited for the rule that where computation is to be made from a certain day, that day is to be excluded.
The Goldsmiths’ Company v The West Metropolitan Railway CompanyCourt of AppealYes[1904] 1 KB 1England and WalesCited for the rule is now well established that where a particular time is given, from a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded.
Gelmini v Moriggia and anotherKing's BenchYes[1912] 2 KB 549England and WalesCited as a case where it was apparently held that the date of the accrual of the cause of action was included and not excluded from the computation of a limitation period.
Nichols v RamselCourt of Common PleasYes(1677) 2 Mod 280England and WalesCited for the principle that a day is but punctum temporis—an indivisible period of time / a point of time.
Prowse v McIntyre and othersHigh Court of AustraliaYes(1961) 111 CLR 264AustraliaCited for the principle that for most purposes of the law time is measured by days; and events are assigned in time to calendar days.
Young v HiggonExchequer of PleasYes(1840) 6 M & W 49England and WalesCited for the remark: apply the criterion which has been before suggested—reduce the time to one day, and then see what hardship and inconvenience must ensue if the principle I have stated is not to be adopted.
Pellew v The Inhabitants of the Hundred of Wonford in the County of DevonKing's BenchYes(1829) 9 B & C 134England and WalesCited as an example by Lord Tenterden CJ in Pellew not actually as an arbitrary rule but as a test of reasonableness to aid the construction of the statutory provision in question in that case.
In re Railway Sleepers Supply CompanyChancery DivisionYes(1885) 29 Cd D 204England and WalesCited for the one-day test.
Setali Development Sdn Bhd & another v Lim You KengFederal CourtYes[1984] 1 MLJ 26MalaysiaCited for the application of s 54(1)(a) of the Malaysian Interpretation Act 1967 in the computation of the time period of one month under r 56 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1980 (M’sia) which disallowed appeals without leave after the expiration of one month.
Li Tat Kong v Official Receiver & anotherCourt of AppealYes[2001] HKEC 35Hong KongCited for the interpretation of the reference to period of days in s 71(1)(a) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance 1966 (Cap 1) (HK) literally to mean period of days only and not a period of weeks, months or years in its interpretation of the reference to period in a subsequent sub-section.
Secretary for Justice v Maxim's Caterers LtdDistrict CourtYes[2009] 4 HKLRD 723Hong KongCited for the interpretation of s 26 of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap 227) (HK) that required any information in respect of an offence to be laid within 6 months from the time when the matter of such information arose.
Jeow Fong Mei v Chong Mee YokeHigh CourtYes[1996] 1 MLJ 387MalaysiaCited for the principle that when computing time by calendar months for example, time is reckoned by looking at the calendar and not by counting days.
Dodds v WalkerHouse of LordsYes[1981] 2 All ER 609England and WalesCited for the principle that when computing time by calendar months for example, time is reckoned by looking at the calendar and not by counting days.
Hughes and another v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd and anotherSupreme Court of New South WalesYes(1993) 29 NSWLR 653AustraliaCited for the principle that their courts construe a period of time which runs from a certain date as excluding that date.
Walton v CoteAppeal Court of QuebecYes(1989) 16 ACQS (3d) 288CanadaCited for the principle that their courts construe a period of time which runs from a certain date as excluding that date.
McCann Milling Co v MartinHigh Court of Justice of OntarioYes(1907) 15 OLR 193CanadaCited for the principle that their courts construe a period of time which runs from a certain date as excluding that date.

13. Applicable Rules

Rule Name
No applicable rules

14. Applicable Statutes

Statute NameJurisdiction
Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) s 24A(2)(a)Singapore
Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) s 50(a)Singapore
Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 3 r 2Singapore

15. Key Terms and Keywords

15.1 Key Terms

  • Limitation period
  • Cause of action
  • Accrual of cause of action
  • Computation of time
  • Interpretation Act
  • Rules of Court
  • Personal injuries

15.2 Keywords

  • Limitation Act
  • Personal Injury
  • Time Computation
  • Singapore Law

17. Areas of Law

Area NameRelevance Score
Limitation80
Personal Injury70
Automobile Accidents60
Civil Procedure50
Statutory Interpretation40
Civil Litigation30

16. Subjects

  • Civil Litigation
  • Personal Injury Law
  • Statutory Interpretation