UMM v UML: Appeal Against Setting Aside and Variation of Consent Orders in Divorce Proceedings

In the Family Justice Courts of Singapore, UMM appealed against the District Judge's decision to dismiss his application to set aside ancillary orders made by consent and to allow UML's application to vary those orders. The ancillary orders concerned the division of matrimonial assets, specifically the matrimonial home and the wife's waiver of maintenance. The High Court, presided over by Debbie Ong J, dismissed both appeals, upholding the District Judge's decisions.

1. Case Overview

1.1 Court

Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore

1.2 Outcome

Appeals dismissed.

1.3 Case Type

Family

1.4 Judgment Type

Ex Tempore Judgment

1.5 Jurisdiction

Singapore

1.6 Description

Appeal regarding the dismissal of an application to set aside ancillary orders and the allowance of an application to vary those orders. The court dismissed the appeals.

1.7 Decision Date

2. Parties and Outcomes

Party NameRoleTypeOutcomeOutcome TypeCounsels
UMMAppellantIndividualAppeal DismissedLost
UMLRespondentIndividualApplication to Vary AM Orders AllowedWon

3. Judges

Judge NameTitleDelivered Judgment
Debbie OngJudgeYes

4. Counsels

4. Facts

  1. The parties were married in 1986 and have two adult children.
  2. The Wife commenced divorce proceedings in March 2016 after a 30-year marriage.
  3. The Husband signed a draft consent order on 7 April 2016 detailing the terms of the parties’ agreement on ancillary matters.
  4. The interim judgment, including the AM Orders, was granted on 23 May 2016 based on the 1st DCO.
  5. The CPF Board objected to the transfer of the Flat with no refund to the Husband’s CPF account.
  6. The Husband signed a second draft consent order on 1 June 2017, containing a variation to the AM Orders.
  7. The Husband applied to set aside the AM Orders, arguing vitiated consent, oppressiveness, and invalidity due to the CPF Board’s objection.

5. Formal Citations

  1. UMM v UML, HCF/District Court Appeal No 24 and 25 of 2018, [2018] SGHCF 13
  2. UML v UMM, , [2018] SGFC 54

6. Timeline

DateEvent
Parties were married.
Wife commenced divorce proceedings.
Husband signed a draft consent order detailing the terms of the parties’ agreement on the ancillary matters.
Interim judgment granted on the terms of the 1st DCO.
CPF Board sent a letter to the Wife informing her of its objection to the transfer of the Flat with no refund to the Husband’s CPF account.
Husband signed a second draft consent order, containing a variation to the AM Orders.
Husband wrote to the court seeking a “review” of the AM Orders.
Husband engaged counsel to contest the validity of the 1st and 2nd DCOs and filed an application to set aside the AM Orders.
Hearing date.
Judgment date.

7. Legal Issues

  1. Setting Aside Consent Orders
    • Outcome: The court held that the Husband did not provide sufficient evidence to prove any vitiating factors such as duress or misrepresentation to set aside the consent orders.
    • Category: Substantive
  2. Variation of Consent Orders
    • Outcome: The court held that the variation was necessary due to the CPF Board’s objection and that it did not substantively alter the original intent of the consent orders.
    • Category: Substantive

8. Remedies Sought

  1. Setting aside of ancillary orders
  2. Review of ancillary orders

9. Cause of Actions

  • No cause of actions

10. Practice Areas

  • Family Litigation
  • Divorce
  • Matrimonial Assets Division

11. Industries

  • No industries specified

12. Cited Cases

Case NameCourtAffirmedCitationJurisdictionSignificance
AYM v AYLHigh CourtYes[2013] 1 SLR 924SingaporeCited for the principle that the power to set aside or vary a consent order on the division of assets under s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter is to be exercised narrowly and that an applicant must prove one of the vitiating factors, or that the order was or has become unworkable.
BMI v BMJ and another matterHigh CourtYes[2018] 1 SLR 43SingaporeCited for the principle that the power to set aside or vary a consent order on the division of assets under s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter is to be exercised narrowly and that an applicant must prove one of the vitiating factors, or that the order was or has become unworkable.
Lee Min Jai v Chua Cheow KoonHigh CourtYes[2005] 1 SLR(R) 548SingaporeCited for the principle that the power to set aside or vary a consent order on the division of assets under s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter is to be exercised narrowly and that an applicant must prove one of the vitiating factors, or that the order was or has become unworkable.

13. Applicable Rules

Rule Name
No applicable rules

14. Applicable Statutes

Statute NameJurisdiction
Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed)Singapore

15. Key Terms and Keywords

15.1 Key Terms

  • Consent Orders
  • Ancillary Matters
  • Matrimonial Home
  • CPF Refund
  • Vitiating Factors
  • Duress
  • Misrepresentation
  • Unworkability
  • Variation

15.2 Keywords

  • family law
  • divorce
  • ancillary matters
  • consent orders
  • setting aside
  • variation
  • matrimonial assets
  • CPF
  • Singapore

17. Areas of Law

16. Subjects

  • Family Law
  • Divorce
  • Matrimonial Assets
  • Civil Procedure