Asnah Bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin: Contributory Negligence & Pedestrian Safety at Signalised Crossings
In Asnah Bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin, the Singapore Court of Appeal heard an appeal regarding contributory negligence in a motor accident. Li Jianlin, the respondent, was struck by Asnah Bte Ab Rahman's vehicle while crossing a pedestrian crossing controlled by traffic lights. The appellant conceded primary liability but argued contributory negligence, claiming the respondent failed to check for traffic. The High Court found no contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the respondent contributorily negligent and reducing damages by 15%. Sundaresh Menon CJ dissented.
1. Case Overview
1.1 Court
Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore1.2 Outcome
Appeal Allowed in Part
1.3 Case Type
Civil
1.4 Judgment Type
Written Judgment
1.5 Jurisdiction
Singapore
1.6 Description
Appeal on contributory negligence in a pedestrian accident. Court of Appeal examines pedestrian's duty at signalised crossings, apportionment of damages.
1.7 Decision Date
2. Parties and Outcomes
Party Name | Role | Type | Outcome | Outcome Type | Counsels |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Asnah Bte Ab Rahman | Appellant | Individual | Appeal Allowed in Part | Partial | |
Li Jianlin | Respondent | Individual | Damages Reduced | Lost |
3. Judges
Judge Name | Title | Delivered Judgment |
---|---|---|
Sundaresh Menon | Chief Justice | No |
Chao Hick Tin | Justice of the Court of Appeal | Yes |
Quentin Loh | Judge | No |
4. Counsels
4. Facts
- Respondent was a 21-year-old National Serviceman.
- Appellant was a taxi driver.
- Accident occurred at a traffic-light controlled pedestrian crossing on Bukit Batok West Avenue 5.
- Respondent was crossing from Block 526 towards Block 374.
- Bukit Batok West Avenue 5 is a dual-carriageway road.
- Appellant was travelling towards Brickland Road.
- Respondent was hit in the second half of the crossing.
- Appellant's taxi was travelling at about 55km/h.
- Weather was fine, road surface was dry, traffic flow was light, and visibility was clear.
- Respondent suffered severe injuries to his head and hips.
- Appellant conceded primary liability and was convicted of dangerous driving.
5. Formal Citations
- Asnah Bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin, Civil Appeal No 175 of 2014, [2016] SGCA 16
6. Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
Accident occurred | |
Appellant convicted of dangerous driving | |
Civil Appeal No 175 of 2014 filed | |
Hearing held | |
Judgment reserved |
7. Legal Issues
- Contributory Negligence
- Outcome: The Court of Appeal found the respondent contributorily negligent, reducing damages by 15%.
- Category: Substantive
- Sub-Issues:
- Failure to keep proper lookout
- Apportionment of damages
- Duty of care of pedestrians at signalised crossings
- Duty of Care
- Outcome: The Court of Appeal held that pedestrians have a duty to take reasonable care for their own safety, even at signalised crossings.
- Category: Substantive
- Sub-Issues:
- Standard of care for pedestrians
- Foreseeability of harm
- Reasonable precautions
8. Remedies Sought
- Monetary Damages
9. Cause of Actions
- Negligence
10. Practice Areas
- Personal Injury Law
- Motor Accident Law
- Civil Litigation
11. Industries
- Transportation
12. Cited Cases
Case Name | Court | Affirmed | Citation | Jurisdiction | Significance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Cheong Ghim Fah and another v Murugian s/o Rangasamy | High Court | Yes | [2004] 1 SLR(R) 628 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that a person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought to have foreseen that his failure to act prudently could result in hurting himself. |
Jones v Livox Quarries Ld | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1952] 2 QB 608 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that contributory negligence depends on foreseeability of harm to oneself. |
Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd | Privy Council | Yes | [1951] AC 601 | United Kingdom | Cited to clarify that contributory negligence does not depend on a duty owed by the injured party to the party sued. |
Butterfield v Forrester | N/A | Yes | (1809) 11 East 60 | N/A | Cited as a case manifesting injustice, as it represented the common law rule that where a claimant’s injury was caused in part by his own fault, he was wholly disentitled from claiming damages from the negligent defendant. |
Bailey v Geddes | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1938] 1 KB 156 | England and Wales | Cited by the Respondent as authority for the proposition that a claimant within a pedestrian crossing can never be subject to contributory negligence. Distinguished by the court. |
Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd | N/A | Yes | [1949] 2 KB 291 | N/A | Cited for the principle that when both the pedestrian and the driver were negligent, whoever’s conduct that was the “effective or predominant cause” of the damage would therefore be ascribed full responsibility for the damage |
Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd | House of Lords | Yes | [1948] AC 549 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that a prudent man will guard against the possible negligence of others when experience shows such negligence to be common. |
Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington | N/A | Yes | (1932) 146 LT 391 | N/A | Cited for the principle that the user of the road is not bound to guard against every conceivable eventuality, but only against such eventualities that a reasonable man ought to foresee as being within the ordinary range of human experiences |
Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng | High Court | Yes | [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that Statutes are to be interpreted in a manner that promotes the purpose or object underlying its enactment |
Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2013] 3 SLR 354 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the purposive interpretation is paramount and takes precedence over any other common law principles of statutory interpretation including the plain meaning rule |
Beckett v Newalls Insulation Co Ltd and another | N/A | Yes | [1953] 1 All ER 250 | N/A | Cited for the principle that a remote probability of harm may not excuse conduct or omissions if serious injury is a possibility |
Paris v Stepney Borough Council | House of Lords | Yes | [1951] AC 367 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that a remote probability of harm may not excuse conduct or omissions if serious injury is a possibility |
Latimer v A E C Ltd | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1952] 2 QB 701 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that in every case of foreseeable risk, it is a matter of balancing the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate it |
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd and another (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) | Privy Council | Yes | [1967] 1 AC 617 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that a reasonable man would not ignore a small risk if action to eliminate it presented no difficulty, involved no disadvantage and required no expense. |
Khoo Bee Keong v Ang Chun Hong and another | High Court | Yes | [2005] SGHC 128 | Singapore | Cited as a case where a bus failed to stop at a traffic-light controlled junction and negligently collided into a pedestrian just when he had started to cross the road, and the pedestrian was found to be contributorily negligent. |
Yip Kok Meng Calvin (a minor) v Lek Yong Han (Yip Ai Puay, third party) | High Court | Yes | [1993] 1 SLR(R) 147 | Singapore | Cited as a case where contributory negligence was found against a pedestrian for failing to keep a proper lookout. |
Chisholm v London Passenger Transport Board | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1939] 1 KB 426 | England and Wales | Cited to restrict the holding in Bailey v Geddes to operate only in situations where the pedestrian is already in the midst of crossing the road as opposed to a situation where the pedestrian is run down immediately after he has left the pavement for the crossing |
Wilkinson v Chetham-Strode | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1940] 2 KB 310 | England and Wales | Cited to restrict the holding in Bailey v Geddes to operate only in situations where the pedestrian is already in the midst of crossing the road as opposed to a situation where the pedestrian is run down immediately after he has left the pavement for the crossing |
Sparks v Edward Ash Ltd | N/A | Yes | [1943] 1 All ER 1 | N/A | Cited to restrict the holding in Bailey v Geddes to operate only in situations where the pedestrian is already in the midst of crossing the road as opposed to a situation where the pedestrian is run down immediately after he has left the pavement for the crossing |
Chun Sung Yong v Au Sze Hung Christopher & anor | High Court | Yes | [1991] 1 HKC 556 | Hong Kong | Cited as a decision by the High Court of Hong Kong where the plaintiff was a pedestrian walking across Nathan Road at the junction of Kimberley Road by way of a pedestrian crossing when he was knocked down by a car driven by the second defendant who was the first defendant’s agent, and the court reduced the damages payable by 25% for contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part |
Cheng (by his tutor Qian) v Geussens | N/A | Yes | (2014) 66 MVR 268 | N/A | Cited for the principle that the configuration of a road is relevant to determining the duty of care and the assessment of contributory negligence |
Tremayne v Hill | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1987] RTR 131 | England and Wales | Cited by the Respondent as authority for his proposition that contributory negligence may not be invoked against a pedestrian where the pedestrian signal is green. Distinguished by the court. |
Frank v Cox | N/A | Yes | (1967) 111 Sol Jo 670 | N/A | Cited by the Respondent as authority for his proposition that contributory negligence may not be invoked against a pedestrian where the pedestrian signal is green. Distinguished by the court. |
White v Saxton | N/A | Yes | (1996) 11 PMIL 10 | N/A | Cited by the Respondent as authority for his proposition that contributory negligence may not be invoked against a pedestrian where the pedestrian signal is green. Distinguished by the court. |
Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2007] 1 SLR(R) 292 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the rule in Browne v Dunn is not a rigid, technical rule; it is not meant to be applied mechanically as to require every single point to be put to the witness. |
Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) | Court of Appeal | Yes | (2012) 294 ALR 315 | Western Australia | Cited as an example of judicial disagreement as to the proper characterisation of the appropriate standard of care courts should adopt in assessing contributory negligence |
British Fame (Owners) v MacGregor (Owners) | House of Lords | Yes | [1943] 1 AC 197 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that a finding of apportionment is a finding upon a question, “not of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis and of weighing different considerations” |
Jackson v Murray and another | Supreme Court | Yes | [2015] UKSC 5 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that the apportionment exercise is to be applied in a “rough and ready” manner, for the factors that the court is required to consider are “incapable of precise measurement” and are often “incommensurable” |
Baker v Willoughby | House of Lords | Yes | [1970] AC 467 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that two aspects stand out in shaping the court’s determination of what is a “just and equitable” apportionment: first, the relative causative potency of the parties’ conduct; and second, the relative moral blameworthiness of the parties’ conduct |
Eagle v Chambers (No 1) | N/A | Yes | [2003] All ER (D) 114 | N/A | Cited for the principle that two aspects stand out in shaping the court’s determination of what is a “just and equitable” apportionment: first, the relative causative potency of the parties’ conduct; and second, the relative moral blameworthiness of the parties’ conduct |
Pennington v Norris | N/A | Yes | (1956) 96 CLR 10 | Australia | Cited for the principle that drivers, unlike pedestrians, are in a position to cause harm. In cases of motor accidents, courts tend to hold motorists as the more culpable party having regard to the “destructive disparity” between a driver and a pedestrian |
Anikin v Sierra and another | N/A | Yes | (2004) 211 ALR 621 | Australia | Cited for the principle that drivers, unlike pedestrians, are in a position to cause harm. In cases of motor accidents, courts tend to hold motorists as the more culpable party having regard to the “destructive disparity” between a driver and a pedestrian |
Teubner v Humble | N/A | Yes | (1963) 108 CLR 491 | Australia | Cited for the principle that apportionment is, at its core, a highly fact-sensitive exercise |
Luong Thi Trang Hoang Kathleen v Public Prosecutor | High Court | Yes | [2010] 1 SLR 707 | Singapore | Cited for the caution against placing undue reliance on unreported precedents |
Cheng William v Allister Lim & Thrumurgan and another and another appeal | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2015] 3 SLR 201 | Singapore | Cited for the definition of contributory negligence |
Froom v Butcher | N/A | Yes | [1976] QB 286 | N/A | Cited for the definition of contributory negligence |
Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1999] 3 SLR(R) 377 | Singapore | Cited for the definition of contributory negligence |
Astley v Austrust Ltd | N/A | Yes | (1999) 197 CLR 1 | Australia | Cited for the definition of contributory negligence |
PlanAssure PAC v Gaelic Inns Pte Ltd | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2007] 4 SLR(R) 513 | Singapore | Cited for the definition of contributory negligence |
Davies v Mann | N/A | Yes | (1842) 10 M & W 546 | N/A | Cited as an example of the common law rule that contributory negligence operated as a complete defence against a claim in damages |
Tay Kim Kuan v PP | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2001] 2 SLR(R) 876 | Singapore | Cited for the caution against relying on unreported decisions indiscriminately in determining the appropriate sentence for the particular case before the court |
PP v Siew Boon Loong | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2005] 1 SLR(R) 611 | Singapore | Cited for the caution against relying on unreported decisions indiscriminately in determining the appropriate sentence for the particular case before the court |
Owens v Brimmell | N/A | Yes | [1977] 1 QB 859 | N/A | Cited for the principle that the court must have regard to the entirety of the circumstances |
Smith v Finch | N/A | Yes | [2009] EWHC 53 (QB) | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that the touchstone is whether the claimant acted reasonably, with the amount of self-care that a normal person would have exercised in the circumstances of a given case |
A C Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden | House of Lords | Yes | [1958] 1 AC 240 | United Kingdom | Cited for the principle that the touchstone is whether the claimant acted reasonably, with the amount of self-care that a normal person would have exercised in the circumstances of a given case |
Lewis v Denye | N/A | Yes | [1939] 1 KB 540 | N/A | Cited for the principle that the touchstone is whether the claimant acted reasonably, with the amount of self-care that a normal person would have exercised in the circumstances of a given case |
13. Applicable Rules
Rule Name |
---|
No applicable rules |
14. Applicable Statutes
Statute Name | Jurisdiction |
---|---|
Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act (Cap 54, 2002 Rev Ed) s 3(1) | Singapore |
Road Traffic (Pedestrian Crossing) Rules (Cap 276, R 24, 1990 Rev Ed) rr 4, 6, 7 | Singapore |
Highway Code (Cap 276, R 11, S8/75) r 20 | Singapore |
Highway Code (Cap 276, R 11, S8/75) r 22 | Singapore |
15. Key Terms and Keywords
15.1 Key Terms
- Contributory negligence
- Pedestrian crossing
- Traffic lights
- Duty of care
- Apportionment of damages
- Highway Code
- Dual-carriageway
- Signalised crossing
- Reasonable care
- Foreseeability
15.2 Keywords
- contributory negligence
- pedestrian crossing
- traffic lights
- duty of care
- Singapore
- appeal
- negligence
- motor accident
17. Areas of Law
16. Subjects
- Tort Law
- Negligence Law
- Civil Law
- Traffic Law