Ravi v Attorney-General: Judicial Review, Legal Professional Privilege & Search/Seizure
In Ravi s/o Madasamy v Attorney-General, the High Court of Singapore dismissed an application by lawyer Ravi S/O Madasamy for leave to commence judicial review. Ravi sought a prohibiting order to prevent the Attorney-General and the Police from reviewing the contents of his electronic devices seized during an investigation, claiming legal professional privilege. The court found Ravi lacked standing and failed to establish a prima facie case that the seized items contained privileged material. The court outlined a procedure for handling claims of legal professional privilege during search and seizure.
1. Case Overview
1.1 Court
High Court of the Republic of Singapore1.2 Outcome
The plaintiff’s application for leave to commence judicial review under Order 53 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court is dismissed.
1.3 Case Type
Civil
1.4 Judgment Type
Judgment
1.5 Jurisdiction
Singapore
1.6 Description
Singapore High Court judgment on judicial review application concerning legal professional privilege, search and seizure of lawyer's devices.
1.7 Decision Date
2. Parties and Outcomes
| Party Name | Role | Type | Outcome | Outcome Type | Counsels |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attorney-General | Defendant | Government Agency | Judgment for Defendant | Won | Charis Low of Attorney-General’s Chambers Cheng Yuxi of Attorney-General’s Chambers Leong Weng Tat of Attorney-General’s Chambers |
| Ravi s/o Madasamy | Plaintiff | Individual | Application Dismissed | Lost | Ravi s/o Madasamy of Independent Practitioner |
3. Judges
| Judge Name | Title | Delivered Judgment |
|---|---|---|
| Ang Cheng Hock | Judge | Yes |
4. Counsels
| Counsel Name | Organization |
|---|---|
| Charis Low | Attorney-General’s Chambers |
| Cheng Yuxi | Attorney-General’s Chambers |
| Leong Weng Tat | Attorney-General’s Chambers |
| Ravi s/o Madasamy | Independent Practitioner |
4. Facts
- The plaintiff, an advocate and solicitor, had his electronic devices seized by the police.
- The seizure was part of an investigation into alleged offences under the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016.
- The plaintiff claimed the seized items contained communications protected by legal professional privilege.
- The Attorney-General objected to the plaintiff's application for a prohibiting order.
- The Attorney-General proposed a framework for reviewing the seized items for privilege.
- The plaintiff refused to identify the specific privileged material within the seized items.
- The plaintiff did not file any affidavit from his clients asserting privilege.
5. Formal Citations
- Ravi s/o Madasamy v Attorney-General, Originating Summons No 378 of 2020, [2020] SGHC 221
6. Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Online post posted on the Facebook page of “The Online Citizen” | |
| Police officers entered Carson Law Chambers and seized the plaintiff’s mobile phone and firm issued laptop | |
| Plaintiff emailed Assistant Superintendent Ng Jun Wen to reserve all his clients’ rights in connection with the seizing of the phone and laptop | |
| Plaintiff wrote to the Police stating that the Police was not to open the contents of the seized items until a ruling is made by the court | |
| The Attorney-General’s Chambers replied to the plaintiff regarding the seized items | |
| The Attorney-General’s Chambers replied to the plaintiff regarding the seized items | |
| The Attorney-General’s Chambers stated that they noted the plaintiff’s continued refusal to particularise the material that he claims is privileged | |
| Plaintiff filed the present originating summons | |
| The Attorney-General’s Chambers wrote to the plaintiff to inform him that its officers would not be commencing review of the seized items, if he provides the Requested Information and if he agrees to an early hearing date of OS 378/2020 | |
| Plaintiff wrote to the Attorney-General’s Chambers reiterating that the Attorney-General’s Chambers’ request for the Requested Information “is in breach” of section 128 of the Evidence Act | |
| Judgment reserved | |
| Judgment |
7. Legal Issues
- Judicial Review
- Outcome: The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for leave to commence judicial review.
- Category: Procedural
- Legal Professional Privilege
- Outcome: The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that the seized items contained legally privileged material.
- Category: Substantive
- Standing
- Outcome: The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the application.
- Category: Procedural
8. Remedies Sought
- Prohibiting order to prevent the Attorney-General and the Police from reviewing the contents of the electronic devices
9. Cause of Actions
- Judicial Review
10. Practice Areas
- Civil Litigation
- Judicial Review
- Administrative Law
- Criminal Law
- Evidence Law
11. Industries
- Legal Services
12. Cited Cases
| Case Name | Court | Affirmed | Citation | Jurisdiction | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Re Nalpon, Zero Geraldo Mario | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2018] 2 SLR 1378 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the court only needs to read the material quickly and appraise whether it discloses an arguable and prima facie case of reasonable suspicion. |
| Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2014] 1 SLR 345 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the three requirements of Order 53 Rule 1(b) need not be considered in any particular order. |
| Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh and another v Attorney-General | Unknown | Yes | [2013] 2 SLR 1108 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the actions of the Police and the Attorney-General are susceptible to judicial review because the source of their powers to review the seized items is public law. |
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and other appeals | Unknown | Yes | [2007] 2 SLR(R) 367 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that legal advice privilege and litigation privilege are conceptually distinct, although they overlap. |
| Comptroller of Income Tax v ARW and another | High Court | Yes | [2017] SGHC 16 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the common law remains relevant to determine the scope of sections 128 and 131 of the Evidence Act. |
| R v Chesterfield Justices, Ex p Bramley | Unknown | Yes | [2000] 2 WLR 409 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that the police in the UK cannot seize material which they reasonably suspect to be legally privileged. |
| Abbey National plc v Clive Travers & Co (a firm) | Court of Appeal | Yes | [1999] PNLR 819 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that solicitors should ordinarily first consult their clients for instructions with regard to applications for disclosure of privileged documents, as legal professional privilege belongs to the client. |
| R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Francis and Francis (a firm) | Unknown | Yes | [1988] 3 WLR 989 | England and Wales | Cited for the proposition that there is no requirement here for legal advice privilege to be positively asserted. |
| Addlesee and others v Dentons Europe LLP | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2019] 3 WLR 1255 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that legal advice privilege, once established, remains in existence unless and until it is waived. |
| Curless v Shel International Ltd | Unknown | Yes | [2019] EWCA Civ 1710 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that the exception to legal professional privilege under section 128(2)(a) of the Evidence Act is commonly referred to as the iniquity exception or the crime-fraud exception to legal professional privilege. |
| United States v Grant | District Court for the Southern District of New York | Yes | No. 04 CR 207BSJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462 (S.D.N.Y., 25 May 2004) | United States | Cited for the principle that the government should be allowed to make fully informed arguments as to privilege if the public’s strong interest in the investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct is to be adequately protected. |
| United States v Gallego | District Court for the District of Arizona | Yes | No. 4:18-cr-01537, 2018 US Dist. LEXIS 152055 | United States | Cited for the principle that a special master, rather than a government privilege team, should conduct the privilege review of seized documents when the documents are seized from an accused who is a criminal defense attorney. |
| United States v Under Seal (In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019) | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | Yes | 942 F.3d 159 (4th Cir, 2019) | United States | Cited for the principle that a government privilege team is inappropriate to conduct privilege reviews where the allegedly privileged material was seized from an attorney’s law office. |
| R v Customs and Excise Commissioners ex p Popely and another | High Court | Yes | [1999] STC 1016 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that the system devised by the commissioners of applying to the Attorney General for him to nominate a member of the Bar to sift through the documents seized before a decision is made as to which of them shall be retained, in my judgment, is a scheme which protects the solicitor concerned and the commissioners and, as this case demonstrates, reduces substantially the areas of dispute. |
| R v Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court and another, Ex p Tamosius & Partners (a firm) | High Court | Yes | [2000] 1 WLR 453 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that it was permissible for the Inland Revenue to bring independent counsel with them when carrying out the search. |
| R (Rawlinson and Hunter Trustees and others) v Central Criminal Court and others; R (Tchenguiz and another) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office and others | High Court | Yes | [2013] 1 WLR 1634 | England and Wales | Cited as the case which crystallised the principle that the substantive privilege review of seized documents must be done by independent counsel not employed by the prosecuting authority. |
| R (on the application of McKenzie) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office | Unknown | Yes | [2016] 1 WLR 1308 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that a seizing authority must have procedures in place which are intended to prevent investigators reading legal professional privileged material and which make it very unlikely that they will do so. |
| Li Shengwu v Attorney-General | Court of Appeal | Yes | [2019] 1 SLR 1081 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the Attorney-General is the guardian of the public interest. |
| R (Prudential PLC) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and others intervening) | Unknown | Yes | [2013] 2 AC 185 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that legal professional privilege belongs to the legal professional’s client, not the legal professional himself. |
| R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex p B. Same v Same, ex p Same (Consolidated appeals) | Unknown | Yes | [1995] 3 WLR 681 | England and Wales | Cited for the principle that legal professional privilege belongs to the legal professional’s client, not the legal professional himself. |
| R (McKenzie) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office | Unknown | Yes | [2016] 1 WLR 3621 | England and Wales | Claimant’s application for permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court was refused. |
| Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General | Unknown | Yes | [2013] 4 SLR 1 | Singapore | Cited for the principle that the applicant has standing if there has been a violation of a public right as a result of a breach of a public duty which has caused him special damage. |
13. Applicable Rules
| Rule Name |
|---|
| O 53 r 1(b) of the Rules of Court |
14. Applicable Statutes
| Statute Name | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|
| Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) | Singapore |
| Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (No. 19 of 2016) | Singapore |
| s 3(1)(b) of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 | Singapore |
| Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) | Singapore |
| s 128 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) | Singapore |
| s 128(2)(a) of the Evidence Act | Singapore |
| s 131 of the Evidence Act | Singapore |
| Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) | Singapore |
| s 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) | Singapore |
| s 11(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code | Singapore |
| Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c 60) (UK) | England and Wales |
| s 8(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c 60) (UK) | England and Wales |
| Taxes Management Act 1970 (c 9) (UK) | England and Wales |
| s 20C(3)(a) of the Taxes Management Act | England and Wales |
| Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) | New Zealand |
| s 143(2) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) | New Zealand |
| s 143(4) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) | New Zealand |
| s 147(a) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) | New Zealand |
| s 146(c) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) | New Zealand |
15. Key Terms and Keywords
15.1 Key Terms
- Legal professional privilege
- Judicial review
- Prohibiting order
- Search and seizure
- Standing
- Prima facie case
- Attorney-General
- Singapore Police Force
- Evidence Act
- Rules of Court
15.2 Keywords
- Judicial Review
- Legal Professional Privilege
- Search and Seizure
- Attorney-General
- Singapore
17. Areas of Law
16. Subjects
- Civil Procedure
- Judicial Review
- Legal Professional Privilege
- Search and Seizure